This paper develops a unified approach to comprehensively analyze individual hedge fund return predictability, both in and out of sample. In sample, we find that variation in hedge fund performance across changing market conditions is widespread and economically significant. The predictability pattern is consistent with the economic rationale and largely reflects differences in key hedge fund characteristics, such as leverage or capacity constraints. Out of sample, we show that a simple strategy that combines the funds' return forecasts obtained from individual predictors delivers superior performance. We exploit this simplicity to highlight the drivers of this performance, and we find that in-and out-ofsample predictability are closely related.
I. Introduction
It is well established that the returns on financial assets, such as bonds and equities, are predictable through time (e.g., Keim and Stambaugh (1986) , Fama and French (1989) ). Since mutual funds and hedge funds hold such assets, it is natural to wonder whether fund performance exhibits similar regularities. The empirical results documented by Ferson and Qian (2004) or Moskowitz (2000) for mutual funds show that their performance is higher in recessions than in expansions. Turning to hedge funds, there are good reasons to believe that their expected returns might be even more sensitive to economic conditions. First, hedge fund managers can trade in different markets and at different frequencies.
This flexibility allows them to engage in dynamic strategies that depend on the states of the economy. In addition, some hedge funds rely heavily on leverage, which might be greatly curtailed in bad times. However, the academic evidence on hedge fund return predictability is relatively scarce.
One notable exception is the study by Avramov, Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (AKNT) (2011), which examines the implications of return predictability for hedge fund selection. Specifically, AKNT implement conditional strategies that incorporate predictability based on macro variables, and they find that these strategies generate superior performance. While their paper highlights the benefits of exploiting predictability, it is silent on the nature of this predictability, that is, to which extent fund returns vary over time, and how they relate to the macro variables. Understanding these cross-fund predictability patterns is likely to provide important insights into the dynamics of hedge fund returns, both within and across investment styles.
This paper addresses these issues by applying a novel and unified approach to comprehensively analyze hedge fund return predictability, both in and out of sample. Our work differs from AKNT (2011) in several respects. First, we conduct a detailed in-sample analysis of hedge fund return predictability. Specifically, we determine the relation between each of the macro variables and individual fund returns, and we provide some economic rationale for this relation. Second, we examine whether conditional strategies based on very simple trading rules can successfully exploit predictability out of sample. As such, we depart from the sophisticated Bayesian approach developed by AKNT. Finally, we exploit this simplicity to get a deep understanding of the drivers of performance. In particular, we examine whether the predictability patterns documented in sample explain when and why the conditional strategies outperform out of sample.
To assess the extent of in-sample return predictability, we determine the proportion of funds in the population having future returns that are i) negatively related, ii) unrelated, or iii) positively related to each predictor we consider. Importantly, this approach allows us to distinguish between true and spurious predictability, because it explicitly accounts for funds that exhibit predictability by luck alone. To measure predictability out of sample, we first examine the performance of single-predictor strategies that select, for each macro variable and at each rebalancing date, the top decile of funds with the highest conditional mean. In addition to its simplicity, each strategy uses predictive information parsimoniously (i.e., only when the predictor values depart from their long-run level). Second, we advocate the use of a combination strategy that averages the fund return forecast obtained from each predictor separately. Intuitively, by diversifying across predictors, the combination strategy should help reduce the impact of poor forecast accuracy, just like a portfolio reduces risk by diversifying across assets.
We apply our methodology to the monthly returns of more than 8,000 hedge funds collected from 5 different providers (BarclayHedge, Trading Advisor Selection System (TASS), hedge fund research (HFR), Center for International Securities and Derivatives Markets (CISDM), and Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI)). To track changes in business conditions, we use a set of 4 economically motivated macro variables: the default spread, the dividend yield, the VIX index, and the net aggregate flows into the hedge fund industry.
The econometric framework developed here makes several contributions. First, it extends past work to address the small-sample bias in predictive regressions, accommodating both return and alpha predictability. Second, we explicitly control for return autocorrelation arising from illiquidity/smoothing by extending the Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (GLM) (2004) approach to our conditional setting.
Starting with the in-sample analysis, we document ample evidence of return predictability between Jan. 1994 and Dec. 2008 . Specifically, we find that 63.3% of the funds in the population have expected returns that vary across changing business conditions. This variation is economically significant (e.g., a 1-standarddeviation decrease in market volatility (VIX) causes an additional return above 6.6% per year for 25% of the fund population). This predictability is not driven by the time-varying premia of the risk factors commonly used in the literature. This result is consistent with AKNT (2011) , who show that the major source of profitability for their Bayesian strategies comes from time-varying managerial skills (alpha).
Examining the predictive ability of the different macro variables separately, we observe a strong commonality across individual funds. Specifically, the predictive pattern is strongly "asymmetric" because changes in the predictor value tend to drive individual fund returns in the same direction. Importantly, this pattern is largely consistent with economic rationale. For instance, we find that a high dividend yield predicts lower future returns for 34% of the funds, suggesting more limited access to leverage during recessions. Consistent with this interpretation, this negative relation is observed across all investment categories except managed futures funds, possibly because these funds depend far less on prime broker funding. Similarly, we observe a negative relation between performance and past inflows across all styles, consistent with the presence of capacity constraints documented by Naik, Ramadorai, and Stromqvist (2007) on hedge fund indices. We find that an increase in flows leads to lower future returns for 28.9% of the funds in the population, and for 39.1% of the funds that operate on the crowded convertible bond market. Finally, periods of higher market uncertainty generally signal lower future performance. This is, for instance, the case for event-driven funds (41.3% of them), reflecting the greater deal failure rate in turbulent periods.
Turning to the analysis of out-of-sample predictability, we implement the different conditional strategies by incorporating real-world constraints encountered by institutional investors. For one, to account for liquidity constraints (i.e., lockup periods), we permit only annual portfolio rebalancing. The evidence shows that an unconditional portfolio that uses past returns to select funds performs well, consistent with Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov (2010) . Such an unconditional portfolio generates a Fung-Hsieh (2004) alpha and information ratio (IR) of 3.8% and 1.1 per year, respectively. For comparison, single-predictor strategies that use only 1 of the 4 macro variables to forecast returns are not able to consistently outperform the unconditional portfolio. Remarkably, the combination strategy produces significant economic gains, delivering an alpha and IR of 5.5% and 1.8 per year, respectively. It also generates a higher risk-return trade-off (IR) than the Bayesian strategies considered in AKNT (2011) .
When and why are the single-predictor strategies more likely to fail? These strategies exploit predictive information whenever the predictor value moves considerably away, either up or down, from its long-run mean. However, in these two cases, the forecast accuracy differs significantly because of the "asymmetric" nature of predictability documented in sample. To illustrate, consider the dividend yield. In recession, when its value is above average, funds with predictable returns tend to underperform as they face additional leverage constraints. As a result, exploiting predictability during such times should be more difficult. Consistent with this intuition, we show that the out-of-sample performance of the strategy falls substantially when the dividend yield is high. Overall, we show that the predictability patterns documented in sample largely explain when and why the conditional strategies outperform out of sample.
In contrast, the combination strategy generates a steady performance over time because it is less affected by the "asymmetry" in the predictive ability of each macro variable. First, averaging across forecasts leads to a very conservative portfolio (on average, 75% of the funds chosen by this strategy are common to the unconditional portfolio). While the benefits of this shrinkage effect are discussed in Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou (2010) in the context of the U.S. stock index, we argue that they are even more important in a multi-asset setting. In such a setting, investors are potentially hit twice (both by choosing funds with low return predictability and by excluding funds with high unconditional performance). Second, the diversification across predictors helps detect the truly predictable funds from the data. Indeed, the active portfolio chosen by the combination strategy (i.e., the remaining 25%) generates a high performance (an alpha up to 7.2% per year over the unconditional portfolio).
The overall evidence documented here makes several contributions. In sample, we find that individual fund return predictability is widespread and largely consistent with economic intuition, reflecting cross-fund differences in leverage or capacity constraints. Out of sample, we show that a simple combination strategy that diversifies across forecasts is able to deliver a performance that compares favorably with the unconditional portfolio and the conditional strategies in AKNT (2011). Finally, our results highlight the important links existing between in-and out-of-sample predictability, and they contrast with the difficulties faced by previous studies to reconcile these two notions (e.g., Bossaerts and Hillion (1999) , Goyal and Welch (2008) ). By taking a multi-fund perspective, we show that the predictive ability of each macro variable is a fundamental driver of the out-ofsample performance of the different conditional strategies.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section II discusses the methodology, and Section III describes the hedge fund data. Section IV contains the empirical results of the paper, and Section V concludes.
II. Understanding Hedge Fund Return Predictability

A. Measuring In-Sample Return Predictability
We attempt to predict future returns on M individual hedge funds using J aggregate variables that potentially capture evolving economic conditions. Predictability is analyzed based on the time-series predictive regression, run separately for each fund,
The dependent variable r i,t+1 denotes the time t + 1 excess hedge fund return (over the risk-free rate), Z j,t ( j=1, . . . , J) is the time t realized value of the jth predictive variable, b i,0 is the intercept, b i, j is the slope coefficients associated with each predictor, and u i,t+1 denotes the unpredictable fund-specific innovation.
Hedge funds follow a wide range of investment strategies, even within preestablished investment styles. Hence, studying individual funds rather than broad indices should allow for a more precise assessment of hedge fund return predictability. Specifically, to determine the predictive ability of variable j on the cross section of fund returns, we decompose the population into 3 distinct categories:
• funds with unpredictable returns (b i, j = 0);
• funds with predictable returns and a negative relation with predictor j (b i, j < 0);
• funds with predictable returns and a positive relation with predictor
Then, we measure the proportions of funds in the population, denoted by π
, that fall into 1 of these 3 categories. The estimation procedure borrows from Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (BSW) (2010) and uses as input the estimated slope coefficients, b i, j , across all funds. Importantly, this approach allows one to distinguish between true and spurious predictability, because it explicitly accounts for funds that exhibit predictability by luck alone (i.e., funds with statistically significant b i, j , even when the true coefficient, b i, j , equals 0). We refer the interested reader to the online Appendix of the paper for further detail.
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While the predictive regression in equation (1) helps determine whether a given fund exhibits predictable returns, there are various sources of predictability. First, hedge fund benchmark expected returns (risk premia) can vary with changing economic conditions. Second, hedge fund managers may have skills in security selection and benchmark timing that depend on the state of the economy. If managers have specialized skills that best apply under specific economic conditions, their private information correlates with the predictive variables, making fund alphas predictable. To capture this intuition, we follow past work (e.g., Christopherson, Ferson, and Glassman (1998) ), and model the dynamics of hedge fund returns using
where f t+1 is the K-vector of portfolio-based benchmark excess returns in time t + 1, β i is the K-vector of fund risk loadings, a i,0 is the intercept, a i, j is the alpha slope coefficient associated with each predictor, and i,t+1 is the idiosyncratic fund-specific term. We again decompose the fund population into 3 predictability categories, now based on alpha variations, and denote by π 0 α ( j), π − α ( j), and π + α ( j) the proportions of funds whose alphas are unrelated (a i, j = 0), negatively related (a i, j < 0), and positively related (a i, j > 0) to predictor j, respectively. We can easily determine the source of predictability in the entire cross section of hedge funds by comparing the proportions of funds with predictable returns, π − R ( j) and π + R ( j), with the proportions of funds with predictable alphas, π − α ( j) and π + α ( j). For one, if the explanatory power of predictor j is entirely driven by risk factors (as opposed to alpha), we would observe π
Given the large number of factors used in equation (2) (typically 7 factors in the Fung-Hsieh (2004) model), we assume that benchmark risk loadings are time invariant. Using more parsimonious models, Bollen and Whaley (2009) and Patton and Ramadorai (2013) find that hedge fund betas are subject to structural breaks. Such breaks are of less concern here, since we are mostly interested in the estimated slope coefficients, a i, j . While unmodeled beta variations can potentially bias the estimated unconditional alpha, they do not affect a i, j as long as the relation between the predictors and factors remains unchanged after the break. Previous studies on mutual funds (e.g., Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1996) , Carhart (1997) ) typically rank and select funds based on unconditional performance measures. Our selection process simply extends this approach to a conditional setting. Initially, we consider a single-predictor strategy (J = 1) to measure the out-of-sample predictive ability of each macro variable separately, and we turn to richer dynamics below.
We implement this strategy for each predictor j ( j = 1, . . . , J) using 3 steps. The 1st step estimates, at each rebalancing time t (e.g., each year) and for each existing fund (i = 1, . . . , M t ), the conditional (excess) mean,
where μ i is the estimated unconditional mean, b i, j is the estimated slope coefficient, and z j,t is the centered predictor value, z j,t = Z j,t − Z j , with Z j being 2 To see this, consider a simple model with one centered predictor, z j,t = Z j,t − E(Zj,t), one factor, f k,t+1 , and one structural break at time t + 1 = τ * :
, where α i,0 is the unconditional alpha and f * k,t+1 = f k,t+1 · 1 {t+1≥τ * } . Assuming that the relation between z j,t and f k,t+1 is constant over time, we have cov(z j,t , f * k,t+1 | f k,t+1 ) = 0, and the bias in a i, j in a constant-beta model is equal to 0:
However, the estimated unconditional alpha is biased:
the sample mean computed using data up to date t. The conditional mean is not estimated with the same accuracy across funds with varying lives and investment strategies. To account for these differences, the 2nd step consists of computing the t-statistic of the estimated conditional mean:
where var( μ i,t ( j)) is the estimated variance of μ i,t ( j). Since the conditional t-statistic indicates how precisely the conditional mean is estimated, it should improve the fund selection process. The 3rd step of our dynamic setup consists of investing in the top decile of funds with the highest t( μ i,t ( j)). This portfolio is held over the next period, after which the selection procedure is repeated.
The investment process followed by the single-predictor strategy is very easy to understand. Specifically, let the unconditional t-statistic be t (
/2 , and let the slope t-statistic be t( (4), we can write the conditional t-statistic of fund i as a weighted average of the unconditional and slope t-statistics,
where the weights, w μ and w b, j , depend on the difference, z j,t , between the current value of the predictive variable, Z j,t , and its long-run mean Z j . Essentially, when Z j,t is close to Z j , the strategy invests in the "unconditional" portfolio: the portfolio holding the top decile of funds with the highest unconditional t-statistic, t ( μ i ). However, when Z j,t departs from Z j , the strategy invests in the "slope" portfolio: the portfolio holding the top decile of funds with the highest signed slope t-statistic, t( b i, j ) · sign(z j,t ), where sign(z j,t ) denotes the sign of z j,t . That is, the slope t-statistic is multiplied by the sign of z j,t to guarantee that the slope portfolio contains funds with the correct exposure ( b i, j < 0 when z j,t < 0, and vice versa).
Besides its simplicity, the single-predictor strategy also accommodates the trade-off between unconditional and predictable performance. This trade-off arises naturally in a large fund population, because it is unlikely that funds with the highest unconditional mean are also those exhibiting the strongest return predictability. Figure 1 illustrates this point using our comprehensive hedge fund data set and the default spread as the single predictor (using other predictors provides similar insights). Graph A shows the relation between the average t-statistic of funds included in the unconditional portfolio and the predictor value, z j,t .
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In a nutshell, we find that the unconditional portfolio yields a high unconditional
FIGURE 1
The Trade-Off between Unconditional and Predictable Performance
In Graphs A and B of Figure 1 , we show the relation between the predictor value and the average conditional t-statistic of funds included in the unconditional and slope portfolios, respectively. To ease interpretation, the predictor value is standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The unconditional (slope) portfolio holds the top decile of funds with the highest unconditional (slope) t-statistic. In Graph C, we illustrate the investment process of the singlepredictor strategy that holds the top decile of funds with the highest conditional t-statistic. Each graph is constructed from our hedge fund data set using the default spread as the single predictor.
Graph A. Unconditional Portfolio Graph B. Slope Portfolio Graph C. Single-Predictor Strategy performance but exhibits low return predictability. While initially large, the conditional t-statistic quickly goes down as |z j,t | increases because of the low and noisy estimate of the predictable component, z j,t b i, j . In contrast, Graph B shows that the slope portfolio includes funds with predictable returns but low unconditional mean. The single-predictor strategy incorporates this trade-off because it invests in the slope portfolio only when return predictability is more likely to pay off (i.e., when the predictor is sufficiently far away from its long-run mean). This investment process, formalized in equation (5), is illustrated in Graph C.
The Combination Strategy
The trade-off between unconditional and predictable performance suggests that investing in the slope portfolio is only advisable when |z j,t | is sufficiently large. But even in this situation, the performance of the single-predictor strategies can deteriorate if the return forecasts are not accurate.
First, due to estimation errors, it may be quite difficult to detect the (truly) predictable funds from the data (those funds with z j,t b i, j > 0). To illustrate, Graph C of Figure 1 clearly shows that, empirically, the slope signal is less precise than the unconditional signal: The maximum value for the t-statistic of the unconditional portfolio equals 3.5, as opposed to only 1.6 for the slope portfolio. This suggests that when |z j,t | gets large, the single-predictor strategy may simply replace funds producing a high unconditional performance with funds exhibiting low levels of return predictability.
Second, even if at some point in time we can precisely estimate the slope coefficients associated with a given predictor, numerous factors, such as the investors' search for successful forecasting models, technological shocks, or institutional changes, can make the predictive model misspecified (e.g., Timmermann (2008) ). Since we expect both the identity of the relevant predictors and their associated coefficients to change over time, the single-predictor model considered so far may sometimes convey wrong signals about future performance, leading to poor fund selection.
To address estimation risk and model misspecification, we implement an alternative conditional strategy building on the combination forecast literature (e.g., Bates and Granger (1969) , Timmermann (2006) ). Specifically, for each existing fund i at the rebalancing time t (i = 1, . . . , M t ), we estimate its conditional t-statistic, t( μ i,t ( j)), using each predictor j separately ( j = 1, . . . , J). Second, we compute the simple average across all J conditional t-statistics:
where
4 We ultimately design an investment strategy that holds the top decile of funds with the highest combination t-statistic, t( μ i,t ).
This combination strategy exhibits several appealing properties. First, since it is unlikely to observe extreme values for all predictors simultaneously, the total weight, w μ , associated with the fund unconditional t-statistic, t ( μ i ), remains high. At the same time, the importance of the slope signals in the investment process decreases because each individual weight, w b, j (z j,t ), is divided by J. The combination strategy shrinks the portfolio toward the unconditional portfolio and reduces the negative impact of both estimation risk and model misspecification (see Rapach et al. (2010) for a discussion in a single-asset setting). In particular, Hendry and Clements (2004) show that combining forecasts provides a good hedge against structural breaks in the data generating process. Second, similar to portfolio diversification, combining forecasts generally reduces the outof-sample forecast error variance and should improve the detection of funds with (truly) predictable returns.
While we could include all predictors simultaneously, the out-of-sample forecast errors of this multi-predictor model tend to be large (see Avramov (2002) and Goyal and Welch (2008) ). However, for comparative purposes, we also report the performance of the conditional strategy based on this model.
C. Estimation Issues 1. Correcting for Small-Sample Bias
It is well known that the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of the predictive regression slope coefficients is subject to small-sample bias (e.g., Stambaugh (1999) ). While this bias disappears in large enough samples, it is an important concern here because the return history for many hedge funds is short.
The small-sample bias arises because the hedge fund innovation, u i,t+1 , in equation (1) is contemporaneously correlated with the J-vector of predictor innovations, υ t+1 .
5 That is, we can express the hedge fund innovation as u i,t+1 = φ i υ t+1 + e i,t+1 , where φ i denotes the J-vector of innovation coefficients, and e i,t+1 is the fund residual term, orthogonal to X t = [1, (Z 1,t , . . . , Z J,t ), υ t+1 ] . As noted by Amihud, Hurvich, and Wang (AHW) (2008), if we include the J-vector υ t+1 as an additional explanatory variable and write
the small-sample bias disappears because the orthogonality holds, that is, E(ei|X) = 0, where
. Of course, we cannot observe the true innovation vector, thus we compute a proxy, υ c t+1 , using the procedure proposed by AHW. After replacing υ t+1 with υ c t+1 , we can compute the bias-corrected estimated slope coefficients, b i, j , by applying standard OLS to the augmented regression in equation (7). Using extensive simulation tests, AHW find that their approach achieves a substantial bias reduction. While other approaches are also feasible (e.g., Nelson and Kim (1993) ), the AHW procedure is computationally much faster, as it boils down to estimating a single regression for each fund. Given the great number of funds in our sample, computational efficiency is strongly appealing. Finally, the framework proposed by AHW does not consider alpha predictability. To address this issue, we show, in the online Appendix, how to extend their approach to incorporate benchmark returns.
Accounting for Hedge Fund Illiquidity
Some hedge funds invest in illiquid assets for which information may not be fully and immediately incorporated into prices. As a result, the fund reported return, denoted by r 0 i,t+1 may differ from the true (but unobserved) return, r i,t+1 . To address this issue, GLM (2004) 
where η i,t−l+1 (l = 1, . . . , L) denotes the independent and identically distributed news component released between time t−l and t−l+1 and L l=0 θ i,l−1 =1. Using the same MA process to model the reported residual in our conditional setting, e 0 i,t+1 = r 0 i,t+1 − E(ri,t+1|Xt), and using equation (7), we can write the reported hedge fund return as
Equation (9) differs from the unconditional framework examined by GLM because it jointly incorporates two sources of autocorrelation in reported returns: i) time-varying expected returns (the 1st right-hand side (RHS) term); ii) illiquidity/smoothing (the 2nd RHS term).
To get estimates of each slope coefficient, b i, j , we can still simply regress the reported returns, r 0 i,t+1 , on the predictors and their innovations. However, the variance, var( b i, j ), is affected by the serial autocorrelation in the reported residual, e 0 i,t+1 . Failing to account for this, we would overestimate the t-statistics associated with b i, j for illiquid funds and wrongly conclude that their returns are predictable. 6 Because e 0 i,t+1 follows an MA process, the number of autocorrelation coefficients required to estimate var( b i, j ) is equal to the order of the MA process. Based on empirical evidence and consistent with GLM (2004), we find that an MA(2) process fits the data extremely well, since it is rejected by only 0.2% of the funds. In addition, while 50.1% of the funds have positively correlated returns at the 1st lag, this proportion drops to 23.3% when we only consider illiquidity-driven correlation (i.e., the 2nd RHS term in equation (9)). This implies that time variation in expected returns is an important driver of hedge fund return serial correlation. These results, along with further detail on the estimation procedure, can be found in the online Appendix.
III. Data Description
We use 4 economically motivated instruments to forecast future hedge fund returns: the default spread, the dividend yield, the VIX, and aggregate fund flows. Given the relatively small number of monthly observations for hedge funds, model parsimony is an important consideration in our choice of predictors. Parsimony also avoids the search over a large number of predictors, which could invoke data-mining concerns.
The default spread is the yield differential between Moody's BAA-and AAArated bonds. Previous studies (e.g., Keim and Stambaugh (1986) ) show that the default spread can predict future stock and bond returns. The dividend yield is obtained from the value-weighted Center for Research in Security Prices index. Fama and French (1989) suggest that the dividend yield is a business cycle indicator that peaks in recession when expected returns required by investors are high. We also use the VIX index from the Chicago Board Options Exchange to proxy for changes in market uncertainty. Taylor, Yadav, and Zhang (2010) present evidence that implied volatilities help predict stock returns. Aggregate flows are calculated as the value-weighted percentage monthly net inflows into our sample of hedge funds. As discussed in Naik et al. (2007) , new money can create capacity constraints, leading to lower future returns. We evaluate hedge fund performance based on monthly net-of-fee returns of live and dead funds using a new data set that aggregates, for the first time, data reported by 5 different providers (BarclayHedge, TASS, HFR, CISDM, and MSCI). To estimate the predictive regression coefficients, each fund is required to have at least 36 monthly return observations, leading to a final sample of 8,376 funds between Jan. 1994 and Dec. 2008. The selection of the hedge fund benchmarks borrows from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model that includes: i) the excess returns of the stock market and the size portfolio; ii) 2 bond factors that capture changes in the term and default spreads; and iii) the excess return of straddle-type trend following strategies in the bond, currency, and commodity markets. Similar to Sadka (2010) , we replace the FungHsieh nontradable default and term factors with the excess return of 2 tradable bond indices computed by Barclays Capital. This allows us to interpret the fund alpha as the excess fund return over the benchmarks. The online Appendix provides more detail on the construction of our combined hedge fund data set and displays some descriptive statistics.
IV. Empirical Results
A. In-Sample Return Predictability
We begin our empirical analysis by measuring in-sample return and alpha predictability across individual hedge funds over the period 1994-2008. Table 1 reports the evidence for all funds in the population, as well as for 10 investment categories. The 1st row (Return) contains the estimated proportions of funds with predictable returns, π Return and Alpha Predictability (In-Sample)
In Table 1 , we measure hedge fund return and alpha predictability in the entire population and across investment categories. In the 1st row (Return), we report, for each predictor (default spread, dividend yield, VIX, and aggregate flows), the estimated proportions of funds in the population exhibiting return predictability, π − R and π + R (− and +). We also report the cross-fund median, b j , and 25%-75% quantiles (in square brackets) of the (bias-corrected) estimated slope coefficient shown in equation (1). Each fund coefficient is standardized (by multiplying the initial estimate by the predictor standard deviation) so that it corresponds to the change in the fund monthly return for a 1-standard-deviation increase in the predictor value. The final column (Joint) shows the estimated proportion of predictable funds using all predictors simultaneously, π JOINT R . The inputs used to compute π JOINT R are the Wald tests of joint significance computed for each fund in the population. In the 2nd row (Alpha), we repeat the same procedure using the (bias-corrected) estimated slope coefficients in equation (2) . Similarly, the 2nd row (Alpha) reports the estimated proportions of funds with predictable alphas, π Overall, three insights stand out from Table 1 . First, there is ample evidence of predictability. In the entire population, about 63.3% of the funds are predictable, while this proportion ranges from 26% (managed futures) to 85.8% (funds of funds) across investment styles. Second, the time variation in performance is economically significant. Examining the cross-sectional distribution of the slope coefficients, b i, j , we see that for 25% of the funds in the population, a 1-standard-deviation: i) increase in the default spread and ii) decrease in the dividend yield, VIX, and aggregate flows causes an additional investment payoff higher than 55, 58, 55, and 60 basis points per month and 6.6%, 7%, 6.6%, and 7.2% per year, respectively. Third, predictability is primarily attributable to alpha variation. Comparing the Return and Alpha rows reveals that for most hedge fund styles, the proportions of funds exhibiting return and alpha predictability are almost identical (i.e., π
7 This interpretation is consistent with AKNT (2011), who find that the benefits from exploiting return predictability mostly come from the time variation in managerial skills (alpha).
Next, we turn to the analysis of the predictive ability of each macro variable on the cross section of fund returns. First, we find that emerging market funds display the strongest positive relation with the default spread ( π + R = 46.9%). Widening credit spreads typically coincide with flight to quality, which could in turn forecast higher future returns. A similar reasoning holds for the carry trade strategies in foreign exchange markets followed by global macro funds ( π + R = 19.4%). Widening credit spreads can trigger the unwinding of carry trades, which leads to increasing future expected returns (e.g., Jylhä and Suominen (2011), Christiansen, Ranaldo, and Söderlind (2011) ).
In recessions, prime brokerage financing is likely to be less available and more costly, forcing hedge funds to reduce leverage and produce lower future performance. As a business cycle indicator, the dividend yield may contain information about leverage. This interpretation is consistent with several aspects of the data. In Table 1 , we see that a higher-than-average dividend yield strongly signals lower future returns for all but one category ( π − R ranges from 22.4% to 52.9%). The only exception is managed futures funds, possibly because such funds may encounter fewer leverage constraints in the futures markets. 8 As a further check, we replace the dividend yield with two alternative measures of leverage availability/cost: the past annual performance of the Prime Broker Index (PBI) and the Libor-Treasury-bill (TED) spread. Consistent with our leverage-based explanation, we show in the online Appendix that a low PBI annual return and a high TED spread both signal lower future performance.
The vast majority of fund styles tend to perform poorly in times of higher market uncertainty. For instance, 41.3% of event-driven funds are negatively associated with the VIX, consistent with the higher deal failure rate in turbulent periods (e.g., Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) ). Convertible arbitrage funds also display negative exposure ( π − R = 26.1%), as an increasing VIX may reduce opportunities of cheap volatility. Indeed, as shown by Choi, Getmansky, Henderson, and Tookes (2010), convertible arbitrage funds often exploit mispriced volatility in convertible bonds. Managed futures funds (which include commodity trading advisors (CTAs)), in contrast, benefit from higher uncertainty ( π + R = 14.2%). This is consistent with the view that these funds can exploit trend reversals occurring during periods of high volatility. 9 Finally, we find strong evidence of negative return predictability for aggregate flows, suggesting that capacity constraints attributable to excessive inflows hurt future performance. Specifically, an increase in flows leads to a decrease in returns and alphas for 28.9% and 25.1% of the funds in the population, respectively.
10 Unsurprisingly, this effect is particularly strong for the crowded market of convertible arbitrage ( π − R = 39.1%). It is also strong for funds of 8 Similarly, mutual fund returns are positively related to the dividend yield (see Ferson and Qian (2004) ) because they are not leveraged and have a strong exposure to the stock market whose expected returns peak in recessions (Fama and French (1989) funds ( π − R = 40.5%), suggesting that the majority of them struggle to generate performance by deploying capital after large fund inflows. In the online Appendix, we include a style-specific flows variable in the regression to understand the origins of these constraints. The results suggest that performance is particularly sensitive to capacity constraints at the strategy level. But given the strong commonality in flows across investment styles, the aggregate flows variable is able to capture, at least partly, the impact of these constraints on performance.
Overall, our results are largely consistent with economic intuition. In particular, we find that the predictability patterns across funds exhibit substantial commonality and are closely related to key hedge fund characteristics, such as leverage availability or exposure to capacity constraints. One important consequence of this commonality is the prominent "asymmetry" in the predictive ability of each macro variable. Specifically, when the value of a given predictor changes, the future fund returns tend to move in the same direction. As shown later, this asymmetry carries strong implications for deciphering the out-of-sample performance of the conditional strategies.
B. Out-of-Sample Return Predictability
While we document ample evidence of in-sample predictability, institutional investors (e.g., funds of funds) typically encounter nontrivial impediments to exploiting hedge fund return predictability out of sample. First, predictable funds may have a low unconditional mean, leading to a trade-off between unconditional and conditional performance. Second, the identity of predictable funds is unknown and must be inferred from the data (estimation risk). Third, the predictive ability of the different macro variables can change over time (model misspecification). To address these concerns, we implement different conditional strategies that carefully incorporate real-world investment constraints and quantify the economic value of predictability. First, we account for liquidity constraints by excluding closed funds as well as considering a 1-year lock-up period (i.e., annual rebalancing). Second, there is a practical limit to the number of individual funds held by funds of funds. While data on such holdings are not publicly available, Lhabitant (2006) indicates that the typical number is about 40. As a result, we limit the minimum and maximum number of funds in the portfolio to 25 and 75, respectively. Third, investors typically do not invest in funds that are too small relative to their own size. As discussed in Ganshaw (2010) , few institutional investors want to represent more than 10% of a fund's assets under management (AUM). We use this rule to set up a dynamic AUM cutoff equal to the minimum fund size such that a "typical" fund of funds does not breach this 10% threshold.
11 The resulting cutoff rises from $12 million at the beginning (Jan. 1997) to $54 million at the end of our sample (Dec. 2008) . Contrary to the constant cutoffs used in previous studies (e.g., $20 million), our filter explicitly accounts for the growth in the hedge fund industry over time.
Finally, we exclude funds of funds, since institutional investors often focus on individual funds to avoid extra fees.
We consider the following trading strategies: i) the unconditional portfolio, which uses the unconditional t-statistic; ii) the single-predictor strategy, which ranks funds according to the conditional t-statistic obtained from each predictor (default spread, dividend yield, VIX, and aggregate flows); iii) the multi-predictor strategy, which uses all predictors simultaneously; and iv) the combination strategy, which averages across the single-predictor t-statistics. The construction of the different portfolios proceeds as follows: At the end of each year, we estimate, for each strategy, the appropriate signal for each existing fund using past 3-year returns, and we form the top decile portfolio (subject to the constraint that the number of selected funds is between 25 and 75). This portfolio is kept during 1 year, after which we repeat the entire procedure.
Panel A of Table 2 reports the out-of-sample performance of all investment strategies between Jan. 1997 and Dec. 2008 (the period 1994 -1996 is used for the initial estimation). First, we observe that the unconditional portfolio generates solid performance: The annual Fung-Hsieh (2004) alpha and IR equal 3.8% and 1.1, respectively, thus easily beating the value-and equal-weighted hedge fund indices. This performance reflects the high signal accuracy of the unconditional mean as shown in Graph C of Figure 1 , and it is consistent with the results obtained by Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007) and Jagannathan et al. (2010) . Second, none of the single-predictor strategies is able to consistently outperform Table 2 , we report the (annualized) Fung-Hsieh (FH) (2004) alpha ( α), residual standard deviation ( σRES), and information ratio (IR); and the (annualized) excess mean ( μ), standard deviation ( σ TOT ), and Sharpe ratio (SR) of the unconditional and conditional strategies (single-, multi-predictor, and combination). While the single-predictor strategies use only one predictor to forecast returns (default spread, dividend yield, VIX, or aggregate flows), the multi-predictor strategy uses all of them simultaneously. Finally, the combination strategy averages across the single-predictor conditional t-statistics. For comparison purposes, we also report the performance of value-and equal-weighted hedge fund indices (VW and EW). All portfolios are formed at the end of the year, starting on Dec. 31, 1996, and ending on Dec. 31, 2007. In Panel B, we compute the median and the 25%-75% quantiles for the number of funds chosen each year, as well as the annual turnover. We also display the estimated 1st-and 2nd-lag FH residual autocorrelation and the average weights associated with the 3 investment categories in which the strategies invest most (Long-Short (LS), Managed Futures (MF), and Event Driven (ED)). Panel C reports the portfolio sensitivity to the FH risk factors along with the model explanatory power, R 2 . Figures in parentheses denote the bootstrap p-values under the null hypothesis that the parameter is equal or inferior to the one associated with the unconditional strategy (1-sided test).
Panel A. Out-of-Sample Performance the unconditional portfolio. While some of them achieve a positive difference in risk-adjusted performance (information and Sharpe ratios), this is entirely driven by the 2008 financial crisis, as shown in the last columns of Panel A. Third, consistent with the previous literature (e.g., Avramov (2002) , Goyal and Welch (2008) ), the performance of the multi-predictor strategy is disappointing, most likely because of severe estimation errors. Remarkably, the combination strategy performs well. Its information and Sharpe ratios, which amount to 1.8 and 1.3, respectively, are statistically significantly higher than their unconditional counterparts (at conventional levels) and remain so even when 2008 is excluded from the sample. This superior performance translates into large economic gains. For each dollar invested in 1997, the terminal wealth reaches $2.17 in Dec. 2008, leading to a 22% increase in wealth relative to the unconditional portfolio ($1.78).
From an investor perspective, the superior performance of the combination strategy is accompanied by several additional advantages displayed in Panel B of Table 2 . First, the strategy does not involve extensive (and possibly unrealistic) portfolio turnover. Second, the autocorrelation coefficients are below those of the unconditional portfolio, and also much lower than the typical hedge fund autocorrelation coefficients (e.g., Lo (2002) ). This implies that the superior performance of the combination strategy is not due to holding illiquid funds. Third, performance is not driven by concentrated bets on specific investment categories. Finally, Panel C shows that the combination strategy behaves like a pure alpha strategy, as its exposures to the Fung-Hsieh (2004) risk factors are very low.
Comparing our approach with the Bayesian strategies examined in AKNT (2011), we find that the combination strategy generates a much larger IR (1.8 vs. 1.2 for their best strategy, PA-4).
12 As shown by Treynor and Black (1973) , an investor therefore obtains a higher Sharpe ratio by combining the Fung-Hsieh (2004) benchmark assets with the combination strategy. This performance increase is economically significant: An investor targeting a 16%-annual volatility (similar to the Standard & Poor's 500) would generate an additional expected return of 7.8% per year over the PA-4 strategy. 13 In addition, the combination strategy invests in a larger number of funds, which addresses the concern raised by AKNT about the high concentration of their Bayesian portfolios. Finally, the conditional strategies considered here are extremely simple, as the investment mechanism boils down to considering 2 portfolios only, the unconditional and slope portfolios (see equation (5)). Thus, our proposed setup allows for a deep understanding of the drivers of out-of-sample performance. Specifically, we show that in our multi-fund setting, there are strong links between in-sample and outof-sample return predictability.
C. The Relation between In-and Out-of-Sample Predictability
Explaining the Performance of Single-Predictor Strategies
While our previous analysis reveals that the single-predictor strategies do not consistently beat the unconditional portfolio, it does not explain when and why these strategies tend to underperform. To address this question, we focus on periods when each predictor's values depart from its long-run mean. At these specific times, the single-predictor strategy moves from the unconditional to the slope portfolio. We conjecture that a key driver of performance should be the ability of the slope portfolio to detect the (truly) predictable funds from the data.
Consider, for instance, the default spread. In Table 3 , we group the values of the default spread, z j,t , observed at each rebalancing date into quintiles, and examine the strategy allocation when z j,t is either far below (bottom quintile) or above (top quintile) its long-run mean. As expected, Panel A shows that when the default spread takes on extreme values, the conditional strategy has a significant exposure to the slope portfolio. For instance, when z j,t is in the top quintile, 79.8% of the funds chosen by the strategy are common to those included in the slope portfolio (% SLOPE = 79.8%).
But more importantly, the quality of the predictive information is very different depending on the sign of z j,t . Looking at the cross-fund average slope t-statistic, denoted by t( b j ), we observe that it is quite low when z j,t is negative (t( b j ) = 1.04), and very high when z j,t is positive (t( b j ) = 2.00). This reflects the 12 While AKNT (2011) do not directly report the IR, they display the alpha t-statistic of their strategy. From this information, we can back out the annualized IR using the following approximation:
, where the t-statistic of the PA-4 strategy equals 4, and T is 144 months. 13 Treynor and Black (1973) show that SR 2 =SR 2 f +IR 2 , where SR is the Sharpe ratio of the optimal portfolio, SR f is the maximum Sharpe ratio of the benchmark assets (equal to 1 over the period), and IR is the information ratio of the active portfolio. For the combination and PA-4 strategies, we have SR = (1 2 + 1.8 2 )
1 /2 = 2.05, and SR = (1 2 + 1.2 2 ) 1 /2 = 1.56, respectively. For a 16%-annual volatility, the additional expected return of the combination strategy is equal to 16(2.05 − 1.56) = 7.8%. (Dec. 31, 1996 -Dec. 31, 2007 into quintiles and focus on the bottom and top groups (containing 2 dates each). In Panel A of Table 3 , we report the characteristics (observed on the formation date) of each single-predictor strategy for the 2 quintiles (bottom and top). We compute the predictor value, z j,t , the proportion of funds that are common to those held in the unconditional and slope portfolios (denoted by % UNCOND and % SLOPE , respectively), and the average slope t-statistic, t( b j ), across the funds selected by the strategy. Each value, z j,t , is standardized (i.e., a value of 1 means that z j,t is 1 standard deviation higher than its normal level). The estimated slope coefficient of each fund is multiplied by sign(zj,t) to guarantee that it is positive only when the fund has the right exposure to the predictor (i.e., when sign( b i, j ) = sign(z j,t )). In Panel B, we report the subsequent annual performance of each strategy following the formation date for the 2 quintiles (bottom and top). We report the (annualized) Fung-Hsieh (2004) strong "asymmetry" documented in sample. Since there are a lot more funds with a positive exposure to the default spread in the population (in Table 1 , π + R = 24.4% vs. π − R = 3.1%), it should be much easier to identify these predictable funds from the data when z j,t is positive. As suggested, Panel B of Table 3 reveals that the out-of-sample performance of the strategy is much higher after observing a high default spread at the rebalancing date; that is, the Fung-Hsieh (2004) annual alpha is equal to 13.6% (as opposed to 4.4% when the default spread is low).
The same analysis applies to the dividend yield and VIX. In each case, Panel A of Table 3 documents a strong asymmetry in the quality of forecasting information, which matches the in-sample asymmetry observed in Table 1 . This, in turn, leads to a strong asymmetry in out-of-sample performance, as shown in Panel B of Table 3. 14 Overall, we find that the return predictability documented in sample largely explains when and why the single-predictor strategies outperform. The key to unveiling this relation is to take a multi-asset perspective; that is, we use the entire cross section of funds to determine the predictors' ability to forecast returns in sample and generate performance out of sample. This approach contrasts with the previous literature (e.g., Bossaerts and Hillion (1999) , Goyal and Welch (2008) ), which finds no relation between in-sample and out-of-sample predictability when one considers each asset in isolation.
Explaining the Performance of the Combination Strategy
In essence, taking large positions in the slope portfolio hurts the performance of the single-predictor strategy at times when the predictor forecast accuracy is poor. How does the combination strategy overcome this difficulty? First and consistent with equation (6), it takes a substantial position in the unconditional portfolio. To illustrate, Figure 2 shows the fraction of funds chosen by each conditional strategy that is common to those held by the unconditional portfolio. While there 
Commonality with the Unconditional Portfolio
We show the evolution of the proportion of funds chosen by each conditional strategy that are common to those included in the unconditional portfolio between Jan. 1997 and Dec. 2008. Graphs A-D of Figure 2 show the results for the singlepredictor strategies (default spread, dividend yield, VIX, and aggregate flows). Graphs E and F display the results for the multi-predictor and the combination strategies, respectively. Graph F. Combination Strategy are large variations for both single-and multi-predictor strategies, the proportion associated with the combination strategy is stable at around 80%, except during the 2008 financial crisis.
While Rapach et al. (2010) highlight the benefits of shrinkage in a singleasset environment, we argue that the combination approach is even more attractive in the presence of multiple assets because of the trade-off between unconditional and predictable performance. Indeed, by investing in the slope portfolio at the wrong time, the investor picks up funds exhibiting low return predictability and, in addition, fails to capture the relatively high performance produced by the unconditional portfolio.
Second, the active bets taken by the combination strategy produce a positive performance that is not subject to the asymmetry described earlier. To see this, we can write the return of the combination strategy, r COM t+1 , as the return of the unconditional portfolio, r U t+1 , plus the return of an investment in a zero-cost longshort portfolio, r LS t+1 :
where r L t+1 is the return of a long portfolio that contains those funds selected by the combination strategy, while r S t+1 is the return of a short portfolio consisting of funds that are only selected by the unconditional strategy. Finally, w t is the weight invested in this long-short position, which, from Figure 2 , is around 20%-25%. For each predictor, Table 4 presents the annual out-of-sample performance of the long and short portfolios, r L t and r S t , when the predictor value, z j,t , is far below (bottom quintile) or above (top quintile) its long-run mean. Contrary to the singlepredictor strategies, there is no asymmetry in performance. Strikingly, Panel A reports that the long portfolio delivers superior performance across all quintiles and all predictors. For instance, the Fung-Hsieh (2004) alpha differential against the unconditional portfolio, α − α U , is equal to 5.1% per year even when the default spread has the "wrong" value (when z j,t is below average). By combining across predictors, the long portfolio produces a high performance that is Table 4 presents the characteristics (observed on the formation date) and the performance (measured over the subsequent year) of the combination long portfolio that only invests in funds that are included in the combination strategy but not in the unconditional strategy. We compute the predictor value, z j,t , and the proportion of funds in the long portfolio that are common to those held by the slope portfolio, %SLOPE. Each value, z j,t , is standardized (i.e., a value of 1 means that the predictor value is 1 standard deviation higher than its normal level). We also report the difference in Fung-Hsieh (2004) alpha and mean between the long portfolio and the unconditional strategy, denoted by α− α U and μ− μ U , respectively. Panel B repeats this analysis for the combination short portfolio that only invests in funds that are included in the unconditional strategy but not in the combination strategy. orthogonal to that of the slope portfolios (i.e., % SLOPE is at most equal to 24.6%).
Bottom
Turning to the analysis of the short portfolio, Panel B reports that the combination strategy also excludes funds that systematically underperform across all quintiles and all predictors.
D. Additional Results
The 2008 Crisis: Structural Breaks and Liquidity Constraints
Panel A of Table 5 reports that in Dec. 2007, the predictor values are far away from their long-run average, making the single-predictor strategies very sensitive to the forecasting accuracy of the respective predictors. Specifically, all strategies load heavily on the slope portfolios, with % SLOPE ranging from 44% to 77.3%. It turns out that while the strategies based on the default spread and the dividend yield perform very poorly during the crisis, the VIX-based strategy resists remarkably well (i.e., the 2008 annual return equals −17.3%, −9.7%, and 1% for the 3 strategies, respectively). We examine whether the occurrence of structural breaks in the predictive regression can explain these performance differences. To address this issue, we compute the hit ratio that determines the proportion of months when the portfolio predictable component, b j,t · z j,t , is positive, where z j,t is the predictor value at the start of each month, and b j,t is the average slope coefficient among the funds included in the slope portfolio. The results in Panel A show that during the crisis, the hit ratio of the VIX is extremely high (83.3%). In contrast, the hit ratios of the default spread and the dividend yield equal 25% and 8.3%, respectively, and are much lower than those computed over the period 1997-2007 (83.3% and 79.2%, respectively) . Importantly, these low hit ratios are not due to a change in sign of the predictor values during the year (i.e., z j z j,t is positive for all months). Therefore, our results suggest that the recent crisis has caused important Table 5 , we examine, for each single-predictor strategy, the stability of the estimated slope coefficient in 2008. We first report the predictor value, z j , as well as the proportion of funds that are common to those held in the unconditional and slope portfolios, % UNCOND and % SLOPE , on the final formation date in Dec. 31, 2007 . Each value, z j , is standardized (i.e., a value of 1 means that z j is 1 standard deviation higher than its normal level). Then, we compute 2 hit ratios that determine the proportion of months in 2008 when: i) the estimated portfolio predictable component is positive ( b j,t z j,t > 0); ii) the predictor value has the same sign as the one observed on Dec. 31, 2007 (z j z j,t > 0). For comparative purposes, we report the same statistics computed during previous years (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) following an extreme predictor value (using bottom or top quintiles depending on the sign of z j ). In Panel B, we measure the performance of the conditional strategies between Jan. 1997 and Dec. 2008 , assuming that the investor can rebalance his portfolio at a monthly frequency in 2008. We report the (annualized) Fung-Hsieh (2004) alpha ( α), and information ratio (IR), the (annualized) excess mean ( μ), and Sharpe ratio (SR). For each of these performance metrics, we report the difference, DIFF, with the baseline case shown in Panel A of structural breaks that mostly affected the default spread and the dividend yield, but not the VIX. Finally, a key issue raised during the crisis is the additional liquidity costs borne by hedge fund investors. Indeed, to prevent massive outflows in 2008, many hedge funds reacted by lengthening redemption notice periods, erecting gates, or creating side pockets. We estimate these liquidity costs by computing the performance of the different conditional strategies, assuming that investors are allowed to rebalance their portfolio monthly during 2008 (using all information available at the start of the month). The results in Panel B of Table 5 report that monthly rebalancing leads to a large improvement in performance compared to annual rebalancing (given in Panel A of Table 2 ). For instance, the average increase in the Fung-Hsieh (2004) annual alpha and IRs across strategies amounts to 2.4% and 0.2, respectively. Based on these metrics, the liquidity constraints carried considerable costs to hedge fund investors during the crisis.
Sensitivity Tests
To determine whether our conclusions are robust to alternative specifications, we perform a range of sensitivity tests, such as removing the dynamic AUM cutoff or imposing a 3-month notice period. In addition, we measure performance using extended versions of the Fung-Hsieh (2004) model that include the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor or the option-based factors of Agarwal and Naik (2004) . The results, reported in the online Appendix, confirm the superior performance of the combination strategy.
V. Conclusion
This paper develops and applies a unified methodological framework to assess both in-sample and out-of-sample hedge fund return predictability. The overall evidence documented here makes several contributions to the literature. First, we provide a detailed analysis of the time variation of individual fund performance across changing economic conditions. We find that return predictability is widespread and follows a pattern across investment categories that is largely consistent with economic rationale. Second, we show that a conditional strategy that simply combines forecasts across each macro variable is able to deliver superior performance. By diversifying across forecasts, the combination strategy avoids making a poor fund selection in times when return forecasts are not sufficiently accurate. Finally, our unified approach allows for a detailed analysis of the drivers of out-of-sample performance. In our multi-fund setting, we show that the return predictability documented in sample is critical in explaining when and why conditional strategies tend to outperform out of sample.
